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YASUHIDE KAWASHIMA*

The American Constitution and
Japanese MinpO, 1945-1980**
Project '87, designed to commemorate the bicentennial of the Constitution, has been stimulating the interest of American scholars in the U.S.
Constitution for the past several years. While a growing number of historians, political scientists, and legal scholars are engaging in research on
the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the nature of the Constitution, and
subsequent constitutional development, others are focusing their attention
on foreign laws in order to assess the influence of the American Constitution abroad. This article deals with the impact of the U.S. Constitution
on Japanese Minp6 (Civil Law), which encompasses such fields of private
law as property, contracts, torts, and family law.
Due to the profound impact American law has made on Japanese law,
it is no exaggeration to say that Japanese law after World War II has
developed in the direction of American law. The Potsdam Declaration,
under which Japan accepted the terms of surrender, required the Japanese
Government to "remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of
democratic tendencies" among the Japanese people, and to establish
"[freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought as well as respect for
the fundamental human rights." I In the occupation of Japan by the Allied
*The author is Professor of History, The University of Texas at El Paso. LL.B., 1954,
LL.M., 1956, Keio University; B.A., 1961, M.A., 1963, Ph.D., 1967, University of California, Santa Barbara; Charles Warren Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard Law
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Forces that followed, the American forces played a key role, and, therefore, reform of the Japanese legal system was primarily modeled after the
American pattern. 2 American law continued to influence Japanese law
after the termination of the occupation. Many American lawyers who first
came as members of the General Headquarters (GHQ) returned to Japan
as visiting professors, scholars, and practitioners, and helped stimulate
3
and facilitate studies on American law.
The fields of Japanese law most strongly influenced by American law
are constitutional law, criminal procedure, corporation law, administrative
law, and labor law. On Japanese Minp6 there has been little direct influence
of the U.S. Constitution: the influence was exhorted only indirectly through
the Japanese Constitution. Thus, the present subject should be analyzed
in a triangular context among the U.S. Constitution, the Japanese Constitution, and the Minp6.
The Japanese Constitution, which is often said to be a "made-in-USA"
product, was established under the direction of GHQ, especially its Government Section. It was, therefore, directly influenced by the United
States, although sources such as the Weimar and other European constitutions and the Japanese drafts were also utilized. 4 The impact of the
American Constitution on the Japanese Constitution was strongest in
Chapter III: Rights and Duties of the People, and in Chapter VI: Judiciary,
where many similar provisions can be found.
The Minp6 (Civil Code) is the basic and most important body of private
law in Japan. It consists of five parts: general legal principles, law of
property, law of obligations, law on relatives, and law of succession. The
Minpd is accompanied by a number of satellite laws that expand and apply
general principles in particular fields. The Japanese Civil Code is closely
akin to the German Civil Code in both organization and content. Before
enactment in 1898, almost thirty years of study and debate went into its
construction, and it has worn well. There have been no important amendments, and its interstices have been solidly filled by judicial construction. 5
The acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and the promulgation of

2. Tanaka, Nihon ni okeru Gaikoku H6 no Sesshu: Amerika H6 (Impact of Foreign Law
in Japan: American Law), in GAIKOKU HO To NIHON HO (FOREIGN LAW AND JAPANESE
LAW) 300-01 (M. Ito ed. 1966).

3. Id. at 313-19; Noda, Nihon ni okeru Hikaku-HO no Hatten to Genj6 (Comparative Jur-

isprudence in Japan: Its Past and Present), in THE
221 (H. Tanaka ed. 1976).

JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUC-

TORY CASES AND MATERIALS

4. Ito, Nihon Koku KenpO to Eibei KenpO (The Constitution of Japan and the English and
United States Constitutions), 600 JURISTO 150-51 (Nov. 15, 1975).
5. Blakemore, Post-War Developments in Japanese Law, 24 WIs. L. REV. 646 (1947); Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868-1961, in LAW
IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY

VOL. 21, NO. 4

23-31 (von Mehren ed. 1963).
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the new constitution in 1946 called for a series of reforms in various areas
of Japanese law. In the Civil Code reform was restricted to the Fourth
and Fifth Books, which cover domestic relations and inheritance, commonly called the family law section. The first three books, dealing with
the basic private individual rights, law of property, and law of obligations,
commonly called the property law section, have remained virtually untouched, since no immediate need for a revision of these parts existed on
constitutional grounds. 6 Indeed, the property law section of the Civil Code
withstood the drastic reform of democratization and has maintained its
"dignity and greatness," according to one Japanese scholar, because it
had already fully adopted the basic principles of bourgeois democracy
such as individualism, freedom, and modem capitalism embodied in the
French Civil Code after the French Revolution and the German Civil
7
Code at the end of the nineteenth century.
The only provisions added to the first section of the Civil Code when
the family law was revised in 1947 were articles I and 1-2. They set forth
the principles conforming private rights to the public welfare, fidelity and
good faith, and prohibition of abuse of rights. These rights had already
been fully recognized by scholars and courts, but received for the first
8
time statutory sanction.
Because of the drastic revision of only one part of the Civil Code, there
emerged within the Civil Code two distinct parts: the property section is
written in the old literal style (bungo-tai) with many Chinese characters
not used in modem Japanese and with katakana (the square Japanese
syllables), while the family law part is written in a modern colloquial style
(kogo-tai) with hiragana(the cursive Japanese syllables).
Although the Civil Code in its property section remains largely unchanged, the Minp6 has undergone in reality some significant transformations since the War. First, books I through III, though not revised,
came to be interpreted in accordance with the spirit of the new constitution, which was greatly influenced by the American law. The second,
and more important, vehicle for the transformation is the enactment of
various supplementary statutes that either have modified or expanded the
basic Minp6 principles. From the Civil Code articles on the public-service
corporation, for example, have evolved a series of special laws such as
the religious corporation law, private school corporation law, medical
corporation law, and social welfare work law that made the establishment

6. Oppler, supra note I, at 317.
7. 1. Kato, Minp6--S~ron (The Civil Code-General Legal Principles), 361 JURISTO 131
(Jan. 1, 1967).
8. Id.; Koshikawa, Principlesof Equity in JapaneseCivil Law, 11 INT'L LAW. 306-17 (1977);
Noda, supra note 3, at 118, 123.
FALL 1987
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of these public corporations easier and provided them with protection
and social assistance. In other areas such as housing, mortgage system,
damages and compensation, family registration, and real estate regulation,
new special laws accelerated changes and helped transform the nature of
9
the Civil Code considerably.
The Civil Code, which covers a wide range of conduct between individuals and between family members, naturally stemmed from some important provisions in the Constitution. Such constitutional provisions that
the United States Constitution strongly influenced are gathered together
in Chapter III as Rights and Duties of the People. The two most important
provisions are article 24 concerning the family law and article 29, the
property section of the Civil Code.
One of the important civil rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution
is due process of law. The fifth amendment provides that "No person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. . . ."10 The fourteenth amendment states that "nor shall any State

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." 11Due process of law has found its way into the Constitution
of Japan. Article 31 states, "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty,
nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to
procedure established by law." 12 The obvious difference between the
provisions of the two constitutions is that the word "property" is not
included in the Japanese clause. Japanese scholars reason that the drafters
were familiar with the bitter experience of the New Deal government,
when a number of economic measures were declared unconstitutional as
an assault on private property, and wanted to eliminate such problems
by avoiding reference to property in the due process clause of the Japanese
Constitution. 13 Due process of law in Japan has thus been narrowly interpreted to cover only criminal process, although recently some scholars
have tried to interpret it broadly to include some of the administrative
processes. 14
The property right, however, is fully guaranteed in article 29. This
article, the basic constitutional provision for the first three books of the
Civil Code, states that "[t]he right to own or to hold property is inviolable.
Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public
9. I. Kato, supra note 7, at 131.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. KENP6 art. 31.
13. Ito, supra note 4, at 153.
14. Shimoyama, Gyosei Tetsuzuki to Jinken (Administrative Procedureand Civil Rights),
638 JURISTO 350 (May 3, 1977).
VOL. 21, NO. 4
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welfare."' 15 Although the actual wordings are considerably different, the
Japanese scholars are in full agreement that article 29 of the Japanese
Constitution, which sets forth the basic property right, is a clear manifestation of the careful study of American property rights under the fifth
amendment and its subsequent development.
The eminent domain provided in the fifth amendment came to be fully
recognized by the Japanese Constitution. While the American provision
states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation," 16 the Japanese counterpart states the power more positively: "Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefor."' 17 In order to implement this general policy a
supplementary law of the Civil Code, the Land Expropriation Law, was
enacted in 1951.18 The most important issue has always been the definition
of the public interest that justifies the taking of private property. Taking
land for the construction of roads and highways for the preparation of the
Tokyo Olympics in 1964 became one of the hottest controversies in eminent domain. 19
Perhaps the most serious controversy on eminent domain arose from
the agricultural land reform initiated by the Occupation under General
Douglas MacArthur. The main objectives of the land reform were to
eradicate the old landlord system, in which the tenant farmers had suffered, and to make the farmers more independent and the farm communities more democratic, by creating owner-farmers with a maximum area
of land of 3 chobu (7.35 acres). It demanded the compulsory transfer to
the cultivators of all lands belonging to absentee landlords and all tenanted
land of resident landlords over I chobu (2.45 acres). As the result, a
massive redistribution of agricultural land took place creating a large
number of independent farmers.20
The landlords, however, put up a vigorous fight against the land reform
that brought about such drastic changes, deeply affecting their way of
life. The most effective protest took the form of law suits. Of the more

15. KENP6 art. 29.

16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. KENP6 art. 29.
18. Sugimura, Tochi Shuyo Seido ni tsuite (On the System of Eminent Domain), 33 H6RITSU JIHr, No. 6, at 4-10 (1961); Suzuki, Tochi Shuy5 to Shoyoken no Hogo (Eminent Domain
and the Protection of Property Rights), 33 HoRITSU JIH, No. 6, at 11-16 (1961).
19. Suzuki, supra note 18, at 16.
20. Kokura, NOgyO HO no RisO to Genjitsu (The Ideal and Reality of Agricultural Law),
35 H6RITSU JIHr, No. 8, at 10-12 (1963); Narita, Tochi Seido (Land System), 361 JURISTO
106-07 (Jan. 1, 1967); 1,Kato, Nrchi Seido (the Agricultural Land System); 316 JURISTO
290-91 (Jan. I, 1967); Wagatsuma, NOchi Kaikaku wa KenpO Ihan ka (Is the Agricultural
Land Reform Unconstitutional?), 2 H6RITSU TAiMUZU 20-28 (1948); R. DORE, LAND REFORM IN JAPAN 129-98 (1959).
FALL 1987
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than 4,000 civil suits, 119 cases dealt specifically with the constitutionality
of the land reform. The landlords demanded recompense from the state,
insisting that the land reform was unconstitutional because the purchase
prices were not "just compensation" as provided in article 29, section 3
of the Constitution. All the earlier court decisions uniformly maintained
that the land reform was done for the public purpose. The courts reasoned
that even when the taking directly benefited particular individual farmers
society
who received the land, it ultimately benefited the public by making
21
more democratic and by stimulating agricultural production.
The landlords argued that the value of the land the government set
became grossly distorted due to rapid inflation. They pointed out that the
money the government paid for one tan (0.245 acres) would not even buy
three salmon! It was, they insisted, virtually "a confiscation without compensation." The courts differed widely on this subject, but the majority
of the decisions held that the agricultural land had no market value because
of a number of rigid restrictions on sale, selling value, and conversion to
other uses. 22 Until the middle of the 1950s23all the civil suits instituted by
the landlords were decided against them.
Meanwhile, new developments were transforming Japanese society,
shaking the very foundation of the system established by the land reform.
High economic growth greatly affected agricultural areas, making the
family structure smaller and nuclear. Outside employment with high income reduced many farmers to part-timers. As the demand for lots for
houses and industrial plants increased, farm land ceased to be the means
of production but became a commodity to be sold at high market prices,
thus causing further fragmentation of the farm land. Many children who
previously would have waived the right to inherit now demanded partible
24
inheritance.
Within only ten years or so after the land reform, therefore, it became
increasingly difficult to guarantee the position of small, independent farmers that the reform created. The high economic development not only
resulted in mass migrations of people to the cities but also increased the
21. 1. Kato, N6chi Kaikaku Ikensosho no D5ki5 (The Cases on the Constitutionalityof
Agricultural Land Reform), 68 H6GAKU KYOKAI ZATSHi 368-70 (1950); M. Kato, Nchi

Kaikaku to Kenp6 (The Agricultural Land Reform and the Constitution), 29 DOSHISHA
H6GAKU 77-81 (1955).

22. 1. Kato, supra note 21, at 371-96; M. Kato, supra note 21, at 81-90; Imamura, 'Seit6
na Hosh6' no Imi (The Definition of 'Just Compensation'), 42 MIN S86 H6 ZATSHI 586-607
(1960).
23. I. Kato, supra note 21, at 356-66.
24. Kuroki, N6ka to S6zoku (Agricultural Families and Succession), 6 JURISTO SPECIAL
ISSUE 325 (1977); Tanaka, Legal Equality Among Family Members in Japan-The Impact

of the JapaneseConstitution of 1946 on the TraditionalFamily System, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.,
640 (1980).
VOL. 21, NO. 4
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demand for a stronger agricultural production force. A new law was passed
in 1961 that shifted emphasis from the ownership to the operation of farm
land, and the former laws were revised, relaxing restrictions on landholding and allowing individual farmers to acquire larger pieces of land
25
than the legal limits.
These new developments, together with the tireless campaign of exlandlords against injustices done to them, led to the government's reconciliatory gesture to compensate the landlords for their losses. The Law
Regarding Payment of Benefits to the Former Landlords was passed in
1965, but it has been criticized for the smallness of the compensation,
which was to be paid by even installments for the span of five or ten
26
years, and for a troublesome procedure.
The high economic development demanded not only large capital and
labor force but land for industrial plants and houses, at the expense of
agriculture. A large number of people began to move into cities from the
countryside, and in the rural areas surrounding large cities, where the
heavy concentration of people and the extensive construction of factories
and plants became more and more evident, the diversion of farm land for
nonagricultural purposes, which had previously been strictly prohibited,
became an ever-growing phenomenon, skyrocketing the price of farm
land. As early as 1959, the conversion came to be publicly sanctioned by
27
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
The selling of land as plant or house lots or for highways with huge
profits by former tenant farmers, who had bought it in the land reform
very cheaply, has created a great sense of injustice and unfairness to the
former landlords. A case the Japanese Supreme Court decided in 1968
involved just such a land sale. The plaintiffs (a group of eighteen former
landlords) sued defendants (a group of fourteen) for unjust enrichment.
Plaintiffs had been forced to sell the farm land cheaply (hardly just compensation) to the defendants, who later sold it to the Public House-Building
Corporation at a price several thousand times over the original price. The
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the existing principle of unjust enrichment could not provide such relief for the former landlords. As long
as the land transfer was made in accordance with the reform policy, the
transfer was final. When the farmer sold the land as house lots at a high
price, gaining a huge profit within a short period of twenty years, the

25. Harada, Ndchi Ripp6 to Rippd Gaku (Agricultural Land Legislation and the Study
of Legislation), 53 H6R]TSU JIHo, No. 14, at 126-28 (1981); I. Kato, supra note 20, at 291.
26. Waseda, Ndchi Hosho H6 to KyO jinushi Dantai (The Law Regarding Payment of
Benefits to the Former Landlords and the Association of Former Landlords), 37 HORITSU
JIHO, No. 9, at 33-38.
27. Narita, supra note 20, at 107-09.
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but to recognize the profit as his, as long
Court insisted, it had no choice
28
as the conversion was legal.
Article 29, section 3 of the Constitution, which states that the government can take private property for a public purpose, can be also interpreted as guaranteeing that the government cannot take private property
other than for public use. It would follow, then, that if the original purpose
of taking property no longer exists, the public taking should be cancelled
and the land be returned to the owners. The Court, however, did not
adopt this interpretation.
During the 1960s, it became increasingly clear that the amount of agricultural land an individual family could own was not a serious problem.
Such an atmosphere came no doubt to affect the court decisions. Lawsuits
instituted by the former landlords against the government or former tenant
farmers seeking invalidation of the land transfers were numerous. In some
of these cases decided in the 1960s, the court, after a long delay, ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs.
In Osaka Prefecture, for example, of 370 cases that were brought before
the court by 1966, the state lost in 110 cases. 29 Even those who won
favorable judgments, however, were faced with the problem of the statute
of limitation. According to the Special Act for the Creation of an OwnerFarmer System, the period of prescription was ten years after the completion of land transfer from landlords to tenant farmers. It should be
noted that delayed trials have been a common but serious phenomenon
in the Japanese judiciary.
A case filed at the Osaka District Court in 1948 by a landlord against
the H city land committee was not decided until 1965. Although the court
found for the plaintiff and invalidated the land transfer, he was unable to
regain the land. The land at issue had already passed on to a third party.
The court maintained that the statute of limitation had run out, asserting
that prescription would not be interrupted by the plaintiff's mere action
30
of instituting a suit.
Another important provision in the Japanese Constitution that has a
direct bearing on the Civil Code is article 13. It states: "All of the people
shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public
welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other govern-

28. Taniguchi, Hanrei Hihyo-NOchi Teny5 (Commentary on a Supreme Court Decision
on Transfer of Farm Land), 59 MIN SHO H6 ZATSHI 983-93 (1969).

29. M. Kato, NOchi Baishu Torikeshi to Shutoku Jiko (The Cancellation of Farm Land
Confiscation and Prescription)(1), 19 DOSHISHA HOGAKU No. 2, at 2 (1967).
30. Id. at 1-16; M. Kato, NOchi Baishu Torikeshi to Shutoku Jiko (The Cancellation of
Farm Land Confiscation and Prescription)(2), 19 DosHISHA HOGAKU No. 3, at 71-89 (1967).
VOL. 21, NO. 4
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mental affairs." 31 This article has obviously been drawn upon the Virginia
Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence of 1776. Although the
U.S. Constitution does not specifically enumerate such rights as life,
liberty, and pursuit of happiness, except for the due process clause in the
fifth amendment, the ninth amendment clearly made human rights inclusive: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 32 The
Japanese Constitution does not have a provision comparable to this article, but scholars and courts tend to understand the fundamental human
has been used to make "the pursuit of
rights broadly. This interpretation 33
happiness" in article 13 inclusive.
The most important means in the Civil Code to safeguard the individual
rights guaranteed by the new Constitution is the law of torts, which remained unchanged until after World War I. It was, ironically, in this field
of the Civil Law that Japanese scholars and courts have been most strongly
influenced by the American law. For one thing, the Japanese law of torts
set forth only a few basic rules within a rough framework (articles 709724) so that more sophisticated ideas and principles could be incorporated
easily into the general framework. Moreover, the American law of torts
has developed into the most advanced body of law, combined with the
introduction of the American approach to esteem the fundamental human
rights through American law. 34 The American law of torts covers almost
all tortious acts, which include battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, negligence, strict liability, nuisance, defamation, misrepresentation, and privacy and can be used to recover for any illegal
35
encroachment.
Perhaps two of the most important constitutional human rights that can
be treated in tort law are privacy and environmental rights. Privacy conflicts with the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution. Article 21 declares that "[f]reedom of assembly and
association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are
guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of

31. Horibe, Kihonteki Jinken-Hyogen no Jiy 0 Chusin to Shite (FundamentalHuman
Rights, Especially Freedom of Expression) 600 JURISTO 163-71 (1975).

32. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
33. Shimoyama, KenpO Dai 31 JO to (Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution and) Due
Process of Law, 33 H6RITSU JIH6, No. 4, at 6 (1961).
34. I. Kato, Zadankai-Nihon HO to Eibei H6 No Sanjunen (Symposium-Thirty Years
of JapaneseLaw and Anglo-American Law) 600 JURIsTo 38 (Nov. 15, 1975); I. Kato, Nihon
FuhO Koi H6 no Konnichi teki Kadai-Amerika HO to no Hikaku ni oite (The Present Task
in the JapaneseLaw of Torts: Comparison with American Law of Torts), 36 H6RITSU JIH6
No. 5, at 10-15 (1964); Morishima, Fuh6 Koi H6 (Law of Torts) 600 JURISTO 226-30 (Nov.
15, 1975).
35. I. Kato, 36 H&ITSU JIH6, No. 5, supra note 34, at 10-11.
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any means of communication be violated." 36 This article is, of course,
based upon the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Japanese
Constitution, however, clearly enumerates "freedom of association" and
"prohibition of censorship," which are not stipulated in the American
Constitution. But American decisional law has construed them as part of
the First Amendment. The more specific and precise provision of the
Japanese Constitution clearly reveals that it took full cognizance of not
37
only the American Constitution but its subsequent judicial development.
Article 21 of the JaJapanese Constitution strictly follows the U.S. Constitution, unconditionally guaranteeing rights of mental freedom like freedom of press and speech, whereas constitutions of many other countries
place conditions on such rights. In fact, at the drafting stage, when the
Japanese drafters expressed some fear about unconditional freedom of
speech and press, the GHQ lawyers assured them that the freedom does
not mean an absolute guarantee even though it was literally unrestricted,
that these guarciting the American practice, which clearly demonstrates
38
antees have never been totally absolute in operation.
Although the Japanese Constitution says "[flreedom of ...

speech,

press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed," this is construed
to mean in actuality, as in the case of the U.S. Constitution's first and
fourteenth amendments, that no government can make laws prohibiting
or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. Since the court has
the ultimate power to judge the constitutionality of these laws, the criteria
for judging constitutionality thus becomes very important. 39 In the freedom of speech and press in Japan, American court decisions, treatises,
and doctrines such as the bad tendency test, clear and present danger,
and preferred position, were fully studied and came to be used as important criteria.
The famous article by S.D. Warren and L.D. Brandeis, "The Right to
Privacy," 40 that has made a great impact on the American law of privacy,
did not influence greatly the thinking of Japanese lawyers until after World
War II, but it thereafter became a sort of Bible in the area of privacy. In
Japan privacy was at first conceived as a problem of torts, such as defamation, false imprisonment, trespass to land, encroachment on ownership, misrepresentation, and nuisance, and of compensating the appropriate
damage accordingly. 4 1 It became increasingly clear, however, that many

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

art. 21.
Horibe, supra note 31, at 164-65.
Ito, supra note 4, at 153.
Horibe, supra note 31, at 165.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
Horibe, Puraivashi(Privacy), 49 H6RITSU JiH6 No. 7, at 66-69 (1977).
KENP6
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situations existed that did not fit into the usual categories. Use of pictures
and names without permission, public exposure of a person's past history
and background, disclosure of private correspondence, wiretapping, shadowing, and publication of critical articles on personal family relations, for
example, do not necessarily fit in the category of defamation. There is,
indeed, an unusually large area of encroachment that could not be solved
by defamation. Moreover, the public policies of protecting individuals in
defamation and privacy are fundamentally different. The right of privacy
is designed to protect individuals to be free from society at large and to
42
be left alone to enjoy private life.
Gradually, scholars and courts began to focus their attention on the
inherently confrontational relations between privacy on one hand and the
freedom of speech and expression and public right to know on the other.
Legal treatises appeared treating privacy strictly as a constitutional right.
Privacy began to be treated as a public right as well as a private right
43
between individuals.
The Japanese Constitution, though it has greatly promoted the spirit of
human dignity, did not establish any provision regarding privacy. It was
recently revealed, however, that during the drafting stage a suggestion
was made by the Occupation lawyers to enumerate the right of privacy
as part of the fundamental human rights. 44
The theory of privacy in America has long been defined as "the right
to be let alone," to be inclusive and universal. Such a right should not
be understood as a tort but as a constitutional right. The case in which
the U.S. Supreme Court clearly recognized privacy as a constitutional
right is Griswold v. Connecticut.45 American treatises since then have
turned the passive "right to be let alone" into a more positive definition,
"the person's right to define the extent other individuals could use his or
her personal information.''46 Taking this new trend in the United States
fully into consideration, Japanese scholars and courts began to view the
right to privacy as derived from the right to "the pursuit of happiness"
47
in article 13 of the Constitution of Japan.

42. Mishima, Nihon Minpo to PuraivashiKen (JapaneseCivil Code and Right to Privacy),
31 H6RITSU JIHO No. 6, at 29-34 (1959).
43. Horibe, supra note 41, at 69.
44. K. TAKAYANAGI, 1. OTOMO, & H. TANAKA, NIHON KENPI SEITEI NO KATEI (THE
DRAFTING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN), I, at 9 (1972).
45. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. Horibe, supra note 41, at 71.
47. Horibe, supra note 41, at 72-73; Sakamoto, Kenpo to Puraivashi (The Japanese
Constitution and Privacy), 22 KOBE H6RITSU ZATSHi No. 1 (1972); Okudaira, Kenpdjo no
Puraivashino Kenri ni tsuitenoIchi Kosatsu (A Study on the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy)
in K6H6 J6 No RIRON (THE THEORIES OF THE PUBLIC LAW) (pt. I) at 63 (1976).
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Another important constitutional guarantee, environmental right, also
started as a tort problem in the Civil Code as invasions of personal interests. For this reason, American nuisance law, which covers a wide
range of daily life, came to be extensively applied in Japan. But American
nuisance doctrine is designed mainly as a remedy for a wrongful act
resulting in merely inconvenient or unpleasant situations in daily life or
at most the fall in price of particular property. The Japanese public hazards, which developed as by-products of the high economic growth since
the 1960s, began to threaten the environment, causing more serious damage such as loss of lives and permanent injuries to human bodies, making
48
the nuisance theory obsolete for remedies.
It became clear in the United States by the beginning of the 1960s that
as a remedy for environmental problems, the nuisance theory, which
concentrates on post-event compensation, was no longer useful. The modem environmental law in America has been concentrating on prevention
and the use of injunctions for environmental protection rather than damages for wrongful actions. Just as the American theory of privacy greatly
influenced the Japanese right to privacy, American environmental law has
49
been making a great impact on the Japanese law.
The American environmental movement has tried two approaches to
the problems. The first is an approach to find the environmental right
within the existing provisions of the Constitution. It is maintained that
freedom from pollution and the right to enjoy a clean environment are
included in "liberty" in "life, liberty, or property" in the fifth and fourteenth amendments or in "others retained by the people" in the ninth
amendment. 50 Among the new theories, the public trust doctrine in natural
resources law has been the most fruitful. This doctrine, advanced by
Professor Joseph Sax, is by no means an entirely new idea but, like the
privacy doctrine of Warren and Brandeis, is built upon the tradition of
51
common law and a series of court cases.
These American developments stimulated the formation of a new environmental rights theory in Japan. This theory holds that an injunction
should be granted irrespective of whether there exists a direct danger to
health, where environmental quality is threatened. Scholars and courts
supporting this doctrine argue that such environmental rights are implicitly
recognized in "the pursuit of happiness" in article 13 and "the right to

48. Morishima, supra note 34, at 227-28.
49. Id. at 228.
50. Takahashi, Amerika KanykO H6 (American Environmental Law) 600 JURISTO 292
(Nov. 15, 1975).
51. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
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maintain the minimum standard of wholesome and cultural living" in
article 25.52
Quite different from the first three books of the Civil Code, where
Americanization occurred only through judicial interpretation and legal
treatises because the statute remained unchanged, the last two books (IV
and V) underwent drastic changes after World War II. Article 24 of the
Japanese Constitution, which provides the basic principles of the family
law, just as article 14 does to the property section of the Civil Code,
declares that marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both
sexes and shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal
rights of husband and wife as a basis. It further states that "[w]ith regard
to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile,
divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall
be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential
53
equality of the sexes."
The American Constitution does not have a comparable provision, but
"the equal protection of the law" in the fourteenth amendment, the inclusiveness of human rights in the ninth amendment, and the women's
voting right in the nineteenth amendment seem to have guaranteed, in
theory at least, women's rights and position. In the late 1960s, the women's liberation movement renewed an earlier desire on the part of women
to assert women's rights more forcefully. Eventually this led to the proposal of the twenty-seventh amendment by Congress in 1972. It declared
that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex." Within three
years of its passage, thirty-five of the required thirty-eight states had
ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). By 1979, the end of the
seven-year ratification, however, no additional states had approved it.
Although Congress extended the time limit to 1982, the ERA failed to
gain the three additional state ratifications. 54 A significant fact is that more
than two-thirds of the states have already ratified the ERA, and the idea
embodied in the ERA has been fully put into practice in these states and
throughout the nation through Supreme Court decisions.
52. Takahashi, supra note 50, at 291-92; J.

GRESSER,

K.

FUJIKURA,

& A.

MORISHIMA,

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN 136 (1981); Upham, After Minamata: Current Prospects

and Problems in Japanese Environmental Litigation, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 264 (1979); Sakuma,
Kofuku TsuikyO Ken (The Right to the Pursuit of Happiness), 638 JURIsTo 264-69 (May 3,
1977).
53. Oppler, supra note 1, at 318; Steiner, Postwar Changes in the Japanese Civil Code,
25 WASH. L. REV. 294 (1950); Watanabe, The Family and the Law: The Individualistic
Premise and Modern Japanese Family Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER OF A
CHANGING SOCIETY 372-73 (von Mehren ed. 1963).
54. A. KELLY, W. HARBISON, & H. BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS

& DEVELOPMENT 734-35 (6th ed. 1983).
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As if to have anticipated this trend in the United States, the Japanese
Constitution as early as 1946 guaranteed the equality of sexes not only
in domestic relations (article 24) but also in society in general (article 14),
which simply states: "All the people are equal under the law and there
shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because
of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin." 55 The Japanese Constitution established, as a whole, a much more liberal, more clear-cut
statutory position as to equality of sexes and dignity of human beings
than that of the United States Constitution.
To comply with article 24, the part of the Civil Code dealing with family
law had to be drastically revised. The revised Civil Code, which took
effect on January 1, 1948, abolished the old family system called the House
(based upon the rights of house heads and inheritance of the headship),
established new relationships between husband and wife and between
parents and child by eliminating discrimination and inequality, and for56
mulated a modern, democratic succession system.
In the practical application of the new Civil Code, Japanese family law
came to be greatly influenced by the American law during the 1950s and
1960s. The period witnessed a growing importance of the Family Court,
which was established in 1949 for promoting the democratization and
57
Americanization of Japanese family law.
The impact of American law has been felt most strongly in relation to
the status of married women, especially their financial position. Although
it has raised the legal status of women to one of equality, the new Civil
Code has not guaranteed actual equality for women. Zaisan bunyo (division of matrimonial property), provided for in article 768, was at first
construed to be a kind of severance settlement or temporary compensation
for an economically weak wife after divorce. More recently, scholars have
been advocating that the wife is entitled to half of the husband's earnings
because such earnings are the product of their joint efforts. More significantly, Japanese scholars have begun to take note of a new trend in
America to view the family property as belonging to the family organism
58
and urge the adoption of some kind of community property concept.
A similar trend has developed regarding the status of the wife in intestate
succession. Stimulated by the American dower right, the intestate succession rights, and a preemptive right of the surviving spouse, the Civil Code

55. KENP6 art. 14.
56. Kawashima, Americanization of Japanese Family Law, 1945-1975, 16 LAW IN JAPAN:
AN ANNUAL 55-56 (1983).
57. Id. at 60-61.
58. Id. at 62-63.
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was revised in 1981, providing a larger share for the spouse on intestate
59
succession.
While the liberal provisions of the new Minp6 based upon article 24 of
the Japanese Constitution have gradually broadened their inherent characteristics and have been interpreted more fully to the letter, the Minp6
has retained some old systems, which in the society of the 1940s and
1950s did not perform their intrinsic democratic function but which the
change in society eventually made work. The divorce by agreement, which
has been retained in the new code as one of the two types of Japanese
divorce, is a case in point. The Japanese consent divorce is unique: it has
no comparable arrangement anywhere in the world. The consent divorce,
which requires only two basic things, mutual agreement and registration,
is private, speedy, inexpensive, and therefore very convenient. The system of divorce by mutual agreement in Japan, which can be traced back
to the early eighth century, was adopted by the original Civil Code of
1898, recognizing in essence the freedom of divorce. 60 Ironically, however, the Civil Code established the system of the House (ie) administered
by the arbitrary power of the House head (koshu), in which all House
members were subordinate to the interest of the House. The divorce by
agreement, though at a glance appearing very modern, was not concluded
by the mutual agreement of the two individuals but became a very premodem institution used only to promote the interests of the House. 6 1
In the process of the revision, the issue of divorce by agreement led to
fervent discussion. Should it be maintained as it had been, modified and
placed under the supervision of the court, or abolished entirely? The
drafting committee voted to retain the divorce by agreement as it had
been without any restriction. 62 The strongest demand for revision came
from the Occupation, when the draft was submitted to it. Thomas L.
Blakemore, one of the Occupation lawyers, requested that the matter be
discussed and voted on in the Diet. 63 The Lower House, however, voted
to keep the original provision. In the House of Councillors, an amendment
requiring the attestation of the family court for divorce by agreement
before registration was proposed and passed, but it was defeated in the
Lower House by more than a two-thirds majority. 64

59. Id. at 64.
60. Miyai, Kyogi Rikon ni tsuite (On Divorce by Mutual Agreement), in
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The new Code thus came to retain the divorce by agreement, which in
theory conforms well to the equality ideal between husband and wife.
Repeated attempts were made to place all consent divorces under the
family court, but failed. Thus the divorce by agreement provided under
article 763 has continued up to the present time without modification.
This system of divorce, which could be achieved privately without involving any public authorities, continued to be abused and misused as
before. It has frequently been used as a device for the actual "expulsion
of the wife." One of the more common practices is the disguised divorce,
in which the spouses, who do not have a real intention to divorce and
to register the divorce in order
continue to live as husband and wife, agree
65
to achieve some temporary objectives.
To what extent does the divorce by agreement guarantee the rights of
women? Actual equality of women regarding divorce is, of course, closely
related to their economic independence. Many lawyers and legal scholars
continue the argument started in 1946, maintaining that the existing law
is not satisfactory. They insist that the family court should be given the
authority to examine the real intention of the parties. Some go so far as
to advocate the elimination of divorce by agreement entirely. Perhaps the
most cogent argument was advanced by Professor Michio Aoyama, who
insisted on either abolishing the system of private divorce or establishing
some method of examining the genuineness of the will of the parties in
order to protect fully the status of wives. To guarantee the dignity of the
individual and the essential equality of the sexes under the existing conditions in Japan there is no positive reason to continue the system. Freedom of divorce and freedom of marriage, he points out, are essentially
66
different.
The supporters of the existing system, mostly younger and more recent
scholars, maintain that it is not the system that needs change or modification. The real purpose of providing the divorce by agreement, along
with the judicial divorce, was for the spouses to terminate their marriage
without exposing their private and personal problems. Adding some conditions, even to the extent of verifying the will of the parties, is against
the basic tenet of the system. It is the changing society, especially the

65. Yamahata, Kyogi Rikon (Divorce by Agreement), 29 H6GAKU SEMINA 23-24 (Aug.
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growing self-consciousness among women, they argue, that is making the
system increasingly more effective.67
Significantly, one of the important groups that rejected the proposed
provision requiring the attestation of the court in 1947 and continues to
support fully the system of divorce by agreement is a group of women
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars. Since the inception of the controversy,
they have argued that divorce by agreement is a very rational system that
should be retained at all costs. Although they fully recognize the fact that
the main victims of the divorce by agreement had been women themselves,
these women lawyers regard the amendment, which was apparently designed to protect women's rights, an unjust encroachment upon freedom
of divorce. They well understood that the Japanese society of the 1950s
and early 1960s was not ideal for the promotion of women's status, but
they perceived that the potential force of the system could be effectively
utilized by women for their liberation. They have, therefore, endeavored
to make society better, in which this liberal system could grow rationally
68
to work fully and smoothly.
Such a perception proved to be correct. The Japanese society since the
late 1960s has been moving exactly in the direction these women lawyers
were anticipating, making the divorce by agreement a very useful and
effective device for women as well as men. The spectacular economic
development that started in the late 1950s expanded the opportunities for
women, creating a strong sense of equality between the sexes. The American women's liberation movement and the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment have also been influencing the position of Japanese women
in every possible way, creating the situation in which articles 14 and 24
could be fully put into practice. In the Japanese society of the 1970s and
1980s, the inferior social, economic, and political positions of women

have been rapidly eradicated, making the fair, equal agreement for divorce
between the spouses more feasible. The major current concern in the
divorce by agreement is no longer the protection of women but the welfare
of the children, who are increasingly considered to be the major victims
of divorce, which, to many spouses, is becoming more and more
unavoidable.

67. I. Kato, Danjo Ddken (Legal Equality of the Sexes), In KAZOKU Ho TAIKEI (AN
OUTLINE OF THE FAMILY LAW), I: KAZOKU Ho SORON (AN INTRODUCTION) 324 (1959);
K. MIYAZAKI, SHIN KONIN Ho (THE NEW LAW OF MARRIAGE) 146 (1950). Nakagawa,
Minp6 ni okeru Danjo By5d6 (Equality of the Sexes in the Civil Law,) 53 H6RITSU JIH6 No.
8, at 18 (1981).
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The divorce by agreement is, by nature, a very democratic and idealistic
system based upon strict equality of the sexes. But in the Japanese society
before and even after World War II, it continued to be misused because
of actual inequality of the sexes. It has become effectively utilized in the
1970s and 1980s largely because of the drastic improvement of the status
of women and their economic, political, and social independence. As far
as women's status and rights are concerned, Japanese society is becoming
rapidly Americanized. This trend, in turn, is providing the possibility of
implementing divorce by agreement in the United States, especially in
has been greatly
California and Washington, where the divorce procedure
69
simplified when both parties are in full agreement.
In conclusion, the examination of the Japanese Minpo against the background of the United States Constitution reveals the profound impact the
latter has made on the former. There are a number of the Minpo provisions
where formal and direct influences of the American Constitution are clearly
evident. More important, however, is the latent influence through court
decisions and scholarly treatises, covering a wider area of the field, which
has been significantly transforming the general nature of the Minp5.

69. Kojima, Obei Minji Saiban ni okeru Shinch~ryu (New Trends in Civil Law Cases in
Europe and America), (pt. II), 17 HIKAKU H6 ZATS-I 247-52 (1983).
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